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Introduction 
An interesting development in human geogra-
phy is the recent surge in the sub-discipline of 
moral geogcaphy. 1 Many of these investigations 
holc.I fast to the premise that proximity increases 
the opportunity for ethical behavior, and therefore 
moraJity has an inherently geographic dimension. 
This proposition is remarkable because of how 
much it seems to resonate with common sense: if 
individuals live near one another, they will likely act 
we11 towards each other, even if each has differing 
motivations for such behavior. Moral geography 
locates ethics (and subsequently the possibility for 
the good life) in place, in the interactions that oc-
cur between people within a bounded locale. This 
articulation between place and the good life has 
seen a revival in both academic and popular 
thought about how to improve social life. One of 
the forms this articulation has taken is the positing 
of the need for greater community to ameliorate 
how people live. 
This paper is an attempt to take the urges of 
moraJ geographers seriously, albeit more critically. 
As such, this paper seeks to understand how com-
munity-as an articulation between people and 
place-can be theorized to understand how com-
munity can express forms of co11cctive identifica-
tion that do not necessitate an csscntializing 
connection between identity and locality. uch lim-
iting notions of identity arc dishonest to the grow-
ing interconnectedness of social life that 
transcends many divisions established by localc-
based community. l t is necessary, therefore, to 
open up the parameters by which people can be-
come beholden to one another rather than merely 
relying upon proximity as the indicator (and limit) 
of care and co11ective action. 
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I draw upon a range of emergent ideas that have emanated from-to use the 
titles of two recent books--a theory of a community that posits social connection 
between those who have nothing in common (Lingis), or more succinctly, com-
munity without unity (Corlett). While exploring the abstractions of the meaning 
of community, I explicate community-building2-particularly urban community-
building programs employed as urban anti-poverty stratcgics--as a signifier 
through which certain struggles (over urban redevelopment, post-welfare state so-
cial policy, shifts in public-private spacings, as well as forms of citizenship and 
other mechanisms to claim the right to participate in the future of a place and so-
cial life) all pass to gain signification. 
Assuming that community is important, this paper attempts to understand 
how community can realize itself as a more open form of collective identification, 
one that does not retreat to static identities or get too stuck in place. Often, com-
munity is thought of as an easily identifiable group of people who share a com-
mon location and who have dispositions towards common actions and 
experiences. Such a definition necessitates that community members maintain and 
demonstrate this commonness, lest the status of membership falters or is brought 
into question. Given the ways in which such a framework for connecting commu-
nity has been shown to be more about the struggle to maintain that disposition 
(so that people arc either excluded from powerful communities or cordoned off 
from power because of the community to which they belong),l this paper will ar-
gue. f~r a sense of commonality that always already exists among people through 
sociality, and that always already binds them into relationships requiring ethical 
e.ngagement. ~ommunity, therefore, is the process by which people can collec-
ttvely engage different modes of identification from which social life unfolds and 
gets experienced but which do not hinder responsive actions towards others. As 
such, community without unity is a form of community that occurs when identity 
and place are both treated as temporary constructions of material li fe that guide 
but do not determine how people act 
This paper, in sum, is an attempt to theorize community as a collective of dis-
positio.ns, or, more directly, a process towards dis-positionings, as opposed to a 
collectton of ~eady~made dispositions. Rather than rehash the popular debates 
ab.out the ~elatlonship between a need for communjty to repatch the social fabric, 
~s paper is an ~ttempt to understand how, following Jean-Luc Nancy, "commu-
~ty, far .f~om bemg ~hat so~iety ~as crushed or lost, is J11hat happens to 11s-qucs-
t1on, ':"~ttn~, e~cnt, in:ipcratlvc- 111 the J11ake of society" (The Inoperative Co1JJ1JJlflli!J 
11; ongmal italics). T his pap~r advocates commuruty without unity and attempts 
to trace how such a commuruty can be conceptualjzed and realized in social life. 
Why Community Without Unity? 
More and more, closed ideas of identity and bounded notions of 1 1 
h d 
. . . oca cs arc 
ar er to ma.mtam ma gl~baliz~g world. Identities arc infused with hybridity and 
transculturatton, so that diasponc models of 1"dcna'ty capture peo I , · . . . . p es cxpertenccs 
of identity more .so th~~ na1:1onal1st contentions or closed definitions of identity.4 
More and more, idcntltlcs, and the places by which they g"; · . . . cun meaning, arc recog-
nized as produced and constructed cnttttcs of social 11• cc rath th · • i1 er an pre-given sta-
tuses. As such, the making of identity is a process 1·n h' h · J w 1c many soc1a actors 
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engage, and arc themselves engaged, at varying levels of competency, participa-
tion, and power. This process is more often a struggle between contested notions 
and these varying levels of competency. As such, collective identification rather 
than being an ideal form of experience is more akin to a struggle that occurs over 
different meanings, interpretations, and expressions of that identity. 
Similarly, while the experience of a globally compressed temporality and spati-
ality maintains its own uneven geography (one that incurs "localization" for parts 
of the planet not incorporated within "global" networks), finding locales that arc 
not infused with the artifacts and expressions of an cxpljcitly global world has be-
come an arduous task. While globalization is by no means a unitary phenomenon, 
globality makes it clear that people and places exist as part of spatial and temporal 
processes, coalesce within varying scales, and arc increasingly connected through 
technology, population flows, governance mechanisms, and capital flows.5 
Given the reali ty of a more interconnected world of processes, it seems that 
the desire to locate the good life in bounded places is a tenuous and difficult ex-
pression both of people and place and of the geographic dimension of collective 
forms of identification. As such, community based on notions of essential iden-
tity and place appears more as a nostalgic ideal and less as an honest appraisal of 
how many experience contemporary social life. But, it is necessary to keep in mind 
that, however idealistic, the desire for community and the associated articulation 
with intimacy, propinquity, and care, is a strong response to a globalizing world 
that many sec as increasingly risky, unstable, fractured, and difficult to navigate. 
While more open experiences of community might be how many people experi-
ence the world, many people turn towards closed definitions of community to ex-
press a sense of control in a world with increasingly diffuse locations of power. 
Moreover, community remains a powerful discourse through which divisions of 
human beings continue to occur, divisions that can be, have been and continue to 
be the basis for politics of exclusion. While closed community can form a basis of 
empowerment for those who can claim membership (i.e. the various identity poli-
tics movements), ultimately this type of community is reactionary to divisions that 
have been set up for the purposes of exclusion and denies the hybridity and 
transculturation of identity which can serve as a more agcntic basis of power. 
Therefore, it is necessary to understand how community can be a useful signifier 
of processual ways to experience identity and place and can be a conduit for 
beholdenness to others, a signifier that captures the flows with which more and 
more people experience social li fe. 
The leap of faith by moral geographers and many others that life lived in a 
bounded place not only is a better li fe but also is even possible is common and 
part of a general "return,, to communjty that expresses a desire for a less frag-
mented, nurturing way of life in which people in places take care of one another.6 
Community has come to signify the authentic li fe that organically grows in places, 
in opposition to the alienation of modern society and its cver-expandjng reach 
across place.7 This is especially pressing given how much the recent "return,, fits 
with the emerging realization of a world in which an unencumbered civil society 
serves as the backbone of social, political, and economic relations through which 
everyone performs their civic responsibilities to one another outside of state ap-
paratuses, a form of governmentaUty that necessitates some expression of a com-
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mon fate, common sense, and common action, and a potential threat to communi-
ties of difference.8 This growing concern to foster life at a local scale raises ques-
tions about belonging, questions which focus on who gets to participate in such 
communities, how such communities get developed in a globalizing world, and 
the dynamics of power that mediate how such communities are generated, main-
tained, interconnected, contested, and put into practice. rundamcntally, what 
needs explication is what community means and how it can be something that 
captures the experience of contemporary collective identification in the wake of 
expanding experiences of globality. In taking on this challenge, it is necessary to 
have a sense of how social subjects are able to recognize themselves in commu-
nity, in common, and then, how that translates into a sense of bcholdcnncss 
within a community without unity. 
Understanding Performative Dispositions 
''Perhaps the only way to understand the free 111e of the Je!f. a way that docs 
not, ho~ever, treat existence as a property, is to think of it as a habit111, an 
ethoJ. Being engendered from one's own manner of being is, in effect, the 
ve_ry d~finition of habit (this is why the Greeks spoke of a second nature) ... 
this bemg engendered from one's own manner is the only happiness rc.-ally 
possible for humans." 
- Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Comm1111i!J, original italics 
'!'o begin to .understa.nd community in a more open manner, this paper turns 
to Pierre Bourdicu's notl~n of the disposition, one that resonates and expands 
upon ~o~e common ~ot:J.ons of how individuals relate to a community. Pierre 
Bourdieu is often considered a social detcrminist, a thinker who believes thal the 
experience of s~cial life is determined by clear forms of identity which interact in 
a power-lad~n hi~rarchy to structure socicty.9 Contrary to this interpretation, how-
ever, Bour.dieu dtrects most of his attention on both how such forms of identity 
get collectively constr.uctc~, as well as how agcntic maneuvering remains possible 
when such forms of identity become strong group identities (particularly against 
the .hege~ony that c~r~n group.s exert over othcrs).10 Fundamentally, Bourdicu 
posits a ~iew of social life that 1S constantly in the making and constantly en-
trenched 111 str~gglcs over t~e powe~ to determine what then is made by society. 
The~efore, turning to Bourdicu provides a way to begin to understand how com-
munity .can. be conceptualized as a more open concept and as one that helps gov-
ern social life. 
Bourdieu rests his conception of social life upon the notion of th / b ·t 
T ki hi f c /JO I /IS. 
a ng s cue rom a scholastic point of view" (Practical Reasoii• 1 B d" 
l · h · '/• our ieu ex-p a111s t at the hab1t11s emerges as "systems of durable trans bl d" · · ,, . , posa e 1spos1t1o ns 
structured through everyday practices (011tli11e 72) 'l 'h , cl " · · . esc 1spos1 t10ns come out 
of a sense of what one can or cannot achieve gi·ven one's posi·a· · · 12 cl · d · . . on in society, an 
gw c practices of navigat:J.ng oneself though social li fe Q ane) 'l 'h b cl . cl · · · h c.J • ey arc cm o 1c 
a.ctivities t at operate t~rough language and practice, as expressions of "the prac-
t:J.cal master~ ~f the soc1~ structure as a whole that reveals itself through the sense 
of th~ postt:J.on occupi~d wi~hin that structure" ("The Social Space" 728). 
Bourdieu argues that social subjects arc fully capable of b th k · h · · o nowing t cir post-
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tion in society as well as changing this position. People with similar subjective and 
objective knowledge of their position in society express such knowledge through 
similar, habitual mechanisms of "practical mastery." As common forms of ha-
bitual action arise in reaction to and in contestation of a known positionality, 
people begin to recognize each other as being in similar positions and inhabiting 
similar social rcalms,13 and to practice life from within a similar habit11s (Bourdieu 
"What Makes a Social Class?"). This occurs through society, which serves to up-
hold patterns and mechanisms of exchange between individuated subjects. Soci-
etal exchange allows subjects to recognize forms of commonality and the 
possibility of collective action. 
Bourdicu, therefore, assumes a certain interaction between individuals and so-
ciety. But he docs not find that individuals arc merely purveyors of the social con-
text in which they arc embedded. The habit11s is formed through the relationship 
between the process of individuation and the processes reproducing social life. 
Social life is not pre-given; rather, it is forged out of the intersections of individu-
ated subjects and the habitual actions of these subjects as they encounter what 
comes to be known as society (i.e. the system of these interactions). As these ha-
bitual actions get repeated and solidi fy into social acts that have meaning within 
society (i.e. traditions, customs, and pcrformativc declarations that pronounce the 
subject as part of and positioned in society), habit/IS takes form. 
The habil11s, therefore, is the embodiment of habitual social acts that have 
meaning within a group of subjects who similarly understand their positionality. 
More discretely, the habit11s is the practiced form of a disposition to interpret (con-
sciously or not) one's place in society. The disposition gains credence when it be-
comes reificd as "second nature" to a subject as a guide to action: dispositional 
action is guided by less-than-conscious beliefs that such action is the proper way 
to act. For a disposition to lessen its steering force, a subject must be able to rec-
ognize it as a disposition, rather than the "natural" way to be. 
It is important to remember that the habit11s is constructed of both structured 
structures and structuri1~ structures, giving the habit11s and dispositions malleabil-
ity over time. By indicating how society simultaneously functions as a noun (sys-
tematic structure of relations), a verb (structured system of relations), and a 
gerund (structuring system of relations), Bourdicu is able to convey that society is 
a system in the making, something that is constantly being created through the 
ways in which dispositions arc practiced and recognized. Changing the habitual 
practices of subjects and the structuring structures of social life can alter disposi-
tions. 
In order for such changes to have any sort of social mcanjng (and therefore 
bearing on collective identification), subjects must recognize the various functions 
of society towards the maintenance of a disposition. These functions interrelate 
to maintain meaning for a disposition in what Bourdicu calls the il/11sio (The Logic 
of Practice). The il/11sio is the set of taken-for-granted beliefs that arc necessary for 
dispositional action to make sense given a subject's position in society. ln other 
words, the il/11Sio represents the "rules of the game" which arc played out by the 
dispositional action of habit11s (The &ties of A ri). While these rules have objective 
meaning, according to Bourdicu, only those operating within the il/11sio truly know 
the " rules," and, therefore, only those with such knowledge can know how to 
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change dispositional action in a socially meaningful way. Knowledge of the il/11sio 
is a precondition for collective action and altering collective forms of identifica-
tion. 
Altering the embodied, dispositional practices of habit11s comes from a fusion 
of objective and subjective knowledge (what Bourdieu calls "structural 
constructivism" (Fowler 17)) and is an agentic process to work within the disposi-
tions of a habit11s. The relationship between a subject and the trifold concept of 
society, mediated by habit11s, is similar to a musician and a composition: while the 
musician plays a structured tune, there is significant room for improvisation (011t-
li11e). Indeed, Bourdieu offers that the ability to master one's hobit11s is the ultimate 
source of freedom ("Scattered Remarks"). In other words, meaningful improvisa-
tion of action is the freedom to change in society that all subjects potentially can 
enact. Enacted collectively, the entire basis of a group identity (i.e. common dis-
positions) can change and be more strategically constructed to establish a "bet-
ter," more powerful position in society. As with any system, perturbations can 
have an effect throughout; society is not indifferent to the improvisations of sub-
jects as they navigate habit11s and create new forms of dispositional activity. 
. Bourdieu conceives of society as a struggle over the better position amongst 
differently empowered groups of collective subjects. Two sets of relationships 
guide subjectivity: the first, discussed above, occurs primarily between individu-
ated subjects in how they recognize one another as in a common and collective 
action that ~mbodies a shared habit11r, the second refers to the relationship that 
these group!ngs have amongst other, differently clispositioned groupings. This lat-
ter relationship occurs within fields, or, the "systems of objective relations which 
are the products of the institution of the social in things, or in mechanisms that 
have ~he qua~i-reali~ of ph.ysical objects" (Wacquant 44). The reality of society is 
expenenced in the interactlon between different subject positions within certain 
fields. Fields take form around valorized relations and reified entities which rc-
cei~e valu~ as forms of capital, including financial, symbolic, cultural,' and social 
capital. D1ffe.rent fi~lds ~alorize certain forms of capital over others. The struggle 
amongst social subjects is to accrue valorized capital in the appropriate field that 
can lead to a better position in society for themselves and for similarly 
dispositioned subjects. 
As this struggle unfolds, appropriate forms of capital arc utilized to realize 
and.impo~;.an ~~derstanding of how to ~roperly act upon other subjects (i.e. nor-
maliz~ an tll11s10 - knowledge, once agaln, accrued from dispositional action and 
exp~nence, so th.at the goal of the "game" is to gain a societal position whereby 
ones way of be~g is recogn_ized. as the norm).14 ror Bourdieu social s truggle 
e.merges over social reproduction, m the desire to reproduce a sense of proper ac-
t1on and to determine the "rules of the game." As such social reprod a· f 
di · · 1 · > uc on o . sp~s1ttona action emboclied in habit11s occurs through the belief that one is act-
lng m the bes~ way possible given one's position. This belief, the knowledge of 
how to act ~oc1all~, sets the par~meters o~ collective meaning for society, and ulti-
mately, reality. This understandtng of reality accorcl1'ng to B d' · "d » . ' our icu, 1s a oxa a 
set of beliefs-but not mere beliefs that equal an idcolog c_ 1 • ' . y or uuse consc1ous-
ness-1n the face of the current condition of the societal str I c b · . . ugg c tOr est pos1-
t:ton (Bourdieu and Eagleton). The doxa is the way in which on k h ali e nows t c re ty; 
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it is what a collectivity of subjects enacting similar dispositional action acts upon, 
and the very justification for action. Society is the collection of struggles for doxa 
to appear as real, through which subjects can imagine themselves in common with 
one another. 
The disposition, for Bourdieu, is at the heart of subjectivity. Nestled some-
where between rational free will and determinism by structure, the clisposition is a 
fusion of the epistemological and the ontological: it is the basis of how one 
knows the world (the doxa) and how that knowing is a statement of how one is in 
the world. Yet what seems underdeveloped in Bourdieu's thought is how the dis-
position emerges, or whether it is an a priori device from which one can formulate 
an analysis of the social and engage social life. At times Bourdieu does seem to fall 
back on an a priorization of the disposition (perhaps as the essential building 
block of subjectivity that fuses rather than problcmati~cs the categories of indi-
vidual and society). I fc docs claim that the operation between habi111s and the field 
is twofold: the field conditions hobit11s (and subsequently the dispositional struc-
ture that inform habit/IS) and hobit11s gives meaning to the field (Wacquant). But 
this assumes that the dispositional capability within subjectivity is already present 
and not revealed simply at the moment this relational activity between field and 
hobit11s occurs. The historical process of this relation brings forth the disposition 
into social life, dcmarking its limits and clarifying its formulation of a certain 
doxa, yet this historicization necessitates a dispositional structure to always already 
exist in social subjects, rather than be a historical contingency itself. The way out 
of this, it seems, is in how Bourdieu understands identity formation. 
Tf disposition is the heart of subjectivity, then the practices of multiple sub-
jects from dispositions in similar points in the social realm form the basis of a 
Bourdicusian theory of community. But the practice of dispositional subjectivity 
by multiple subjects docs not necessitate group formation and communal action 
in everyday life. Bourdicu acknowledges that in the rclationality of the field, the 
illusion, and the hobit11s that brings to fore the sociality of subjects, there is a dis-
tinction between "classes on paper" (or theoretical groupings of subjects) and an 
actual group mobilized in common struggle.15 'l'his distinction arises because, in 
the words of Stuart ff all, there is no necessary correspondence between knowing 
one's position and acting according to the logic that would best improve one's po-
sition in society (a logic that always hinges on capital accumulation for Bourdieu). 
Indeed, while Bourdieu's sociology offers an insight as to how similarly 
dispositioncd subjects can recognize themselves conceptually as in common, it 
does not provide elucidation into how similarly dispositioncd subjects could or 
should act upon this recognition. 
In Bourdieu's formulation, he shortcuts from the epistemological othering 
necessary for identity formation (i.e. knowing that different positions in society 
exist but that similar positions can allow for similarity in identity through pro-
cesses of categorization) to the ontological positioning that populate such forma-
tions (i.e. all those with similar doxa arc necessarily within the same category and 
identity). Jn part, this can be restated to say that Bourdieu glosses over how the 
articulation of different social identities informs the interpellation of subjects 
into those identities. This shortcut can be expanded and clarified by recognizing 
how this occurs via social performatives, social pcrformatives that Bourdieu mar-
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ginally discusses in guise of the politics of naming. Stepping o ff from Bourdicu's 
initial insights, the ability to think and act community without unity becomes 
dearer, particularly as an ongoing process of identity making. 
Bourdieu does offer this: " this work of categorization, i.e. of making-explicit 
and of classification, is performed incessantly, at every moment of ordinary exist-
ence, in the struggles in which agents clash over the meaning o f the social world 
and of their position within it, the meaning o f their social identity" ("The ocial 
Space" 729). H e does recognize that there is work to be done to uphold the cat-
egories of identity (though this work is not ideological, it is doxic) and that sub-
jects arc not magically transposed into identities simply because certain 
classification schemes exist. But what seems missing is the technology of this in-
terpellation that conjoins the classification (identi fication) with certain 
subjectivities residing in similar dispositional structures that can be usefully under-
stood as classes (identities). In other words, how do classes on paper become 
classes in action? And how do they materialize into a collective of subjects who 
act beholden to one another? 
In part, this lack is one limitation of Bourdicu's wo rk fo r thinking through 
community without unity, for he too o ften assumes that if a subject is classified by 
another subject who has more capital than the former, the agentic struggle of im-
provising class meaning docs not occur until after the latter has classified the 
for~~r, ~a~g the ?ispos.itional actions of both subjects simply determined by 
pos11:1onality tn a societal hierarchy. In other words, he is too quick to assume that 
with the authority backed by the right capital, the pcrformativc classificatory utter-
ances of those of higher rank in society easily creates the classi fication realities of 
tho~e lower ~ social position, therefore limiting the improvisational abili ty of 
subjects. Judith Butler pursues a similar poin t in cri tiquing Bourdicu'R use of 
Austin's per.formative p~osophy of language ("Performativity's Social Magic"). 
According to Bourdieu, subjects arc both classified and classifiers simul ta-
neously, t~ough with the uneven distribution o f capital and the uneven power dif-
ferent subjects and groups can utilize, not all arc equally classified and classifiers. 
~ut while the classification is an on-going struggle, the social pcrformativc to clas-
sify serves as a weak basis to hail o thers into a classification. AlJ subjects arc 
classed, but some are more classed than others. In Bourdicu's own theorization 
t~at makes capital accum~l~~on the detc~mining factor in dispositional improvisa-
tton, he falls back on stabilizing the classifications that he wants to keep as " classes 
on paper." 
In pa.rt, Bourdieu is limited by his use o f performatives as mere exchanges in 
a sym~oli~ ec?nomy of language. The use o f pcrformativcs is bound by the un-
even distribution o f the cu.ltural. and symbolic capital that informs a subject how 
to ~se. them properly. While this economy is framed by the ill11Sio and field in 
which 1t operates, ~ourdicu seems to already assume a closure about the meaning 
of such pcrformattve acts and how such uses are ~uncti'ons of fi d f . . . a 1xe sense o 
what classes (1dentttJes) can and will be formed SubJ'ccts th t t h · . · a con est t c meaning 
too much thus fall outside of a field and its " rules o f the " h h . . . . . game rat er t an par-
t:tc1pate m 1mprov1sational activities that serve to alter 1' t and 't · t al . ~ . i s in crn economy 
of capital. fhe mearung of pcrformative acts is scemi'ngl · · h . . y an a pnon to t c sys-
tem of mtcracaons that provide the context to those m · I h d canings. n o t er wor s, 
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Bourdieu seems to argue that meaning is pre-social. J Jenee, identities are brought 
into being by being named, but only if these names arc already recognizable as 
names, as identities, as possible positions of subjectivity, as already having mean-
ing. l'or Bourdjeu, this namjng is done by the authority always al ready given that 
power to name: "the holder of the monopoly of official 11an1i11g' ("The Social 
Space" 734). This fixing of authority to name through the technology of the offi-
cial, the public,'6 seems to undermine any understanding that might be gained 
from Bourdieu about dispositional activity as more than a reaction to a pre-deter-
mined structure of meaning: dispositional activity, whether collective or not, can 
only be a struggle against what has already been named. 
This might not seem to bode well to fu rther explore communjty without 
unity, for the unity is seemingly already achieved in this theorization and the " im-
provisational" move becomes to remove the unity rather than to begin from com-
munity without unity. The disposition, it seems, is in the last instance determined 
by how it has always already been named by authority, not the supposed basis by 
which a subject can position itself to claim naming through improvisation. H ow-
ever, thjs actually serves as a foundation to move closer towards community with-
out unity, particularly if the disposition is problcmatized further as a point of 
departure for pcrformative struggle (that has discursive as well as material out-
comes). T hat is, it is necessary to fu lly pursue what Bourdicu means when he 
writes the class-on-paper: it " is not really a class, an ac/11al class, in the sense of a 
group, a group mobilized for struggle; at most, it might be cal led a probable clasl' 
("The Social Space" 725). In other words, it is necessary to pursue not only how 
classes, identities and the subjects inhabiting such formations arc fu nctions of ar-
ticulation and in tcrpcl lation (Laclau and Mouffc), but also how groupings are al-
ways probable, always in po tential, and therefore always lacking in unity (but not 
necessarily unification). Before T return to how this potential is engendered in the 
very constructio n of the habit11s and its dispositional structures that bring identifi-
cation and eventually community without unity to the fore by its performative 
namings, the meaning of potentiali ty needs elaboration. To fu lly explore the 
struggle that Bourdicu seems to close off in the last instance, it is necessary to 
turn to the philosophers of potential, particularly Jean-Luc Nancy. 
Nancy and Diasporic Retreats of Freedom 
"Being-called or being-in-language is the non-predicative property par 
excellence that belongs to each member of a class and at the same time 
makes its belonging an aporia." 
- Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Com1m111iry 
Similar to Bourdicu, N ancy seeks to understand how collections of individu-
als come together outside of an a priori basis of essential identity for common 
action. r Jowever, before one attempts to sec the connections, one must reconcile 
the extreme differences between the two and the limits on simply fusing the two 
together into a new way to think of community. As such, o nly cer tain concepts 
overlap and only p rovis ionally, and this paper will focus further on these points, 
leaving aside the incommensurable disagreements. 
With that disclaimer, it is important to note that while Bourdicu reconciles the 
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power of the state as an authoritative structure in identity fo rmation (and ulti-
mately calling upon an increased state presence as a fortification against the in-
creased social stratification wrought by neo-liberal globalization,1' Nancy explicitly 
wants to move away from formalized structures such as states (in the sense that 
states have been understood as 11atio11-states) bound to definitive geographies of 
belonging and territory (Van Den Abbecle). However, he also wants to avoid the 
individualism of neo-liberalism (Dallmayr). While both Bourdieu and Nancy write 
from a France deeply implicated in a post-Fordist social formation and accelerated 
globalization, Nancy seems to be more willing to embrace this epoch as one of 
positive change, even given the struggles that emerge (as exemplified for him by 
the massacres of contemporary Sarajevo). While Bourdieu at times wants to hang 
onto the historical geographies of struggle, Nancy seems to desire a more poetic 
geography of community that explodes the hegemonic geographies rooted in 
roots. Nancy, seeking the deferral of geography as part of common identity (i.e. 
the French or the Germans), seems to be a poetic geographer of diaspora and dis-
persal. 
Whil~ Nancy's work is at times impenetrably dense, he docs directly address 
the .questJon of community, explicitly advocating for community without unity. 
~e he ~cfines community in numerous ways (community as ecstasy, commu-
ruty as finitude, community as myth)18 to refuse a singular definition, he docs push 
towa_rds. c~mmuni~ as forged in potential. T he potential for community is com-
~uruty 10 itself, wh1ch Nancy terms "for itsclf"-"ipseity" (The Inoperative Co1111n11-
111ry). Th~ c~alescence of that potential into actuality is its moment of fixity, and 
such f~ty 1.s death. The. essentializing logic of any moment of fixity is what 
Nancy 1d~~tlfi~s as' th~ uruty. that kills co~munity (or rather, the unity from which 
commuruttes kill): 'Wtth 11111tary community lco1111J11ma11tl 1111eJ there is nothing but 
deat~, ~ad not the sort of death found in the cemetery, which is a place of spacing 
or distJnctness, but the death found in the ashes of crematorium ovens or in the 
accumulati,ons of cha_rnel-ho~s~s" (Bei11g Si11g11/ar Pl11ral 154-5; original italics).19 
Nancy s hyperbolic descnptJons warn against actualizing a Bourdieusian "class 
o~ p~per'' without accounting fo~ ~~w that "class on paper" discounts the impro-
visations that occur when collectJv1ttes actually happen in social li fe. While Nancy 
may seem nihilistic, h~ alludes to numerous examples of such communi ty at work 
~uch .as German ~az1sm (based on the operationalization of an essential Aryan 
1dentJty)'.the B~sruan-~erb ~nd the Hutu and Tutsi genocides (similarly justified 
by essentJal n.otJons. of 1de~~ty and the threat to a community and its way of life), 
and .rrenc~ ng~t-wmg ?olitt~s (such as Le Pen and his associated politics of fra-
terruty, nationality, and 1solattonism). 
. W~ile Nancy moves through the logic of communitarianism quickly to its end 
m fascism and totalit~rian po~~cs, it is easy to follow his logic, and the basis of his 
argument follows ant1-essenoalist efforts in identity work At th t f N ' . . . . · e 'lea rt o ancy s 
thoughts on co~muruty 1s th~ moperatlve community: inoperative because it docs 
not work. Working commuruty, he claims is the achievement f b I · . . . , o c ongmg as a 
basts of communal interaction and once the ges ture tow d b I · · d . . ' ar s e ongmg 1s ma e, 
one introduces technologies of exclusion Nancy dcst'res · h . . . · a community t at neces-
sitates no such technologies for 1ts reproduction because th · d · . . . ere ts no repro uctton: 
commuruty 1s recogruzed as always happening CommunJ·ty 1·s al h · · ways appenmg as 
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the struggle over what community means. Once that struggle achieves resolve, the 
process of that happening ends and community becomes an operative function to 
reproduce that resolve. Jn other words, once a community resolves itself as a 
community of something (i.e. Germanness), then the communi ty has a purpose: 
to maintain that something via its reproduction (i.e. its Germanness, by getting rid 
of all of the non-Germans). Once community has a purpose, it becomes opera-
tive and necessitates technologies to uphold that purpose. As Nancy's allusions in-
dicate, these technologies always have the potential to turn into physical violence. 
l'or Nancy, individuals are always already within a context of sociality, not pre-
given entities brought into social life or constructed out of society.20 Subjectivity is 
a matter of finitude in the sense that identification is contingent on another to sig-
ni fy the limits of the self and to recognize the self as a difference (Jngram). Thus, 
being is always being-with (ITcideggcr's Mitdasei11 that comes before Dasei11), and 
the basis of subjectivity is in sharing.21 
This then appears as the logical precursor to Bourdieu's d ispositional activity. 
In Bourdieu's sociology, Nancy would argue that dispositions do not only beget 
their imp rovisational characteristics and insight in to a greater societal context, but 
more importantly, engender (and arc formed by) other dispositions. A significant 
difference in the two sets of ideas revolves around the categorization of these dis-
positions. For Bourdicu, the interaction among dispositions occurs in the realm of 
meaning, meaning which has been shown to be a pre-given entity of society in the 
above analysis, so that dispositional activity is recognized by individuated subjects 
as in common, as similar, as performativcly sharing meaning. Dispositions, then, 
seem to be a priori categorized. Theoretical classes can easily slide into classes in 
social life. For Nancy, however, dispositional activity is recognized by subjects be-
cause it is recognized as uncommon, as different, as contesting shared meaning. 
As difference is a fundamental concept of subjectivity, it is the sharing of dif-
ference (via exchange) that is at the heart of subjectivity. Dispositional activity is 
only realizable in the express ion of di fference through exchange. Difference must 
be upheld, or exchange ceases to occur. As thinkers from Aristotle to Marx have 
recognized, it is difference that makes exchange possible, for interlocutors in ex-
change only engage exchange because the other has something or is something 
different. The commonality resides in the existence of forms of exchange, forms 
of exchange which get reworked in everyday li fe to become acts of sharing, not 
just exchange. O ut of these mechanisms of exchange, which form the basis for 
social life (though not in any necessarily structured manner), subjectivities can rec-
ognize how dispositional activity can be constructed as similar. T he realization of 
being in common is a concept that must necessarily be constructed, constructed 
in certain ways, and main tains little correspondence to how different subjectivities 
approach exchange. Thus, Bourdieu's "class on paper" gets constructed and pur-
posefully enacted to become a real class, a real configuration of dispositions, but 
only after much wo rk is conducted to make this transition possible- work which 
never reaches an end. Therefore, in contrast to Bourdicu, N ancy views collectivity 
and community as something to be generated by social subjects not uncovered by 
them given the proper doxa. Nancy insis ts that community is the ever-occurring 
effort to make a "class on paper" become real through shared exchange and that 
community should not have to work itself in this manner. 
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To argue that community does not nor should not work is not to argue that 
there is no activity necessary to bring forth community. Rather, it is to posit the 
opposite: that community based on immanent essence needs to work because the 
basis of community is the constant and active unworking, or deferral, of es-
sence. 22 Community is oot ao organic force bringing people together and connect-
ing these people to a place. Rather, community needs to be articulated through 
communication: the active engagement of subjectivities being-with one another 
that calls attention to the betweenness of subjects. This betweenness is not a bond 
because a bond assumes independent entities that exist on either end of the bond. 
Through communication, finite subjects do not appear in social life (because they 
are always already implicated in it); rather, communication is the act of what 
Nancy calls "compeara11ci' (The Inoperative Co111111111Jity) . Co111peara11ce is the exposure 
of the self through the other in which the self is able to recognize its own finitude 
aod, therefore, realize that its subjectivity is a condition that presupposes togeth-
erness (i.e. Nancy's version of individuation, but a version that docs not achieve 
~n end for ~s process, as being is always being with another and becoming). Be-
wg together is the movement of being-with articulated as being-in-common (dif-
ferent than belonging or unity) through communicative acts. Communication is 
the activity of sharing-not just exchange-that finds its ultimate realization and 
arti~ula~on in the myth of co~~nity. Because singularity is always already ex-
pos10g itself through commurucation and myth, individuation as it occurs in lib-
eral thought does not exist; the only reality is relational. 
It seems necessary to point out the emergent intersections with Bourdicu. 
While Nancy problcmatizes subjectivity with greater complexity than Bourdieu, 
one can see that both pursue a subjectivity that situates itself in a relational reality. 
The exposure that Nancy writes on, the transcendental sociality that resides in the 
betwe~nn~ss of ~ommu~cation through difference, seems roughly similar to a 
Bo~rdieusian notion .of dispositions that emerge as already implicated in the his-
ton~~ struggles for~ng the fields, the ill11sio and the habit11s through which the dis-
pos1tlon ex~rcss~s itself. The disposition might well be argued as the historical 
fo:m .of be10g-with. To. argue this, clarification is needed to work through its im-
plications for commuruty without unity, and further elucidation must occur to 
hi~hligh~ Nancy's work on myth and sharing as the articulations that bring forth 
b~mg-:'~th (compeara11ce)~ or~ in Bourdicusian terms, the particular ill11Sio in which 
dispos1tlons engage social life and become the basis for an actual, realized class. 
For Nancy,. it is. throug~ com~unication that community without unity 
em~rges as a p~int of ~nopcrative shanng. The myth that compcars, following this 
~ogic, exp.oses ~mgulanty ~s th~ constan~ difference of shared identification: myth 
is the articulation that brings into relation "the inscr1'pa'on of · h . . . a meaning w ose 
~anscen~encc 1s md~firutely and constitutively deferred ... the practice of a shar-
ing o~ (d1fferentj voices a~d of an articulation according to which there is no sin-
gul~r.1ty but th~t exposed m common" (The Inoperative CoiJJIJtlllli{y BO). Myth is the 
acllv1ty that brings together because it maintains the traces of th h' t · I · . c 1s Ortea articu-
lations from acts of compeara11ce. Myths arc not only the stories we tell ourselves 
but also the. way by which we tell ourselves. Myths arc always already publi~' 
shared, and m that sense performative il locutionary acts of · · B ' 
. . commumcatton. ut 
while myth provides the enframing of compeara11ce, the constant deferral of the 
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meaning of myth is always already present because of inherent differences, and 
myth is also a point at which unity might be closed to end this deferral. Myth can 
become operative if it is worked to interrupt the deferral and if it establishes it-
self as more than myth (similarly to how doxa is emancipatory knowledge only if 
it is recognized as doxa rather than truth). The imperative moment of freedom, 
then, arises as the always present potential to interrupt myth's interruption of de-
ferral. 
In other words, the attempt to re-work myth as an interruption of deferring 
meaning, which lends itself to giving meaning to those subjectivities communicat-
ing and positioning themselves through the myth, is an attempt to fix myth. To fix 
myth is a gesture towards believing in myth past myth: to make myth truth. This 
attempt at closure is an attempt at closing identification into identity. Nancy rec-
ognizes that this attempt is the very heart of political struggle in a post-fi'ordist 
social formation in which the enhancement or flexibility is attempted to be re-
solved by fixity (i.e. multiculturalism that csscntializes difference). The reaction of 
exposing identity to deferred meaning can be to close more strongly the meaning 
of identity (i.e. close the myth-meaning of Gcrmanness at the very moment of its 
exposure as constant deferral into true Germanncss). Community without unity is 
a gesture to resist the closure of myth. Because modernity has been a series of 
processes to close myths, of creating identities (and subsequently identity poli-
tics), the agcntic political project of a post-modern epoch is to actively defer: 
"Community then becomes the production and the appropriation of a pre-given 
identity" (Dcvisch 246-7). 
What emerges here is Nancy's reconciliation with a world that he claims is 
"anything but a sharing of humanity" (Being Si11g11/or P/11ralxiii). It is a world that is 
in constant struggle between fixity and deferral, between roots and routes. In this 
world, Nancy finds freedom in the very being-with that constitutes what might be 
called our contextual ontology. ln this world, Nancy secs freedom emergent in the 
ability to engage one's potential for deferral, to be against fixity. However, one can 
only do so within the confines of a shared myth, or else move beyond being-with 
in to ipscity; Nancy wants co-ipseity (Bei11g Si11g11/or P/11ro~. 
But what, or where, is this identification without identity or community with-
out unity? It resides in the dispersal of diaspora.23 In diaspora, one's very being is 
deferred and meaning is always on the run. Diaspora is the basis of freedom be-
cause it provides the social formation of interruption of meaning while simulta-
neously providing a myth that is constantly being reworked from a number of 
infinite points in an infinite number of ways. Diasporic identification comes with-
out nation, without a metaphysics of presence articulated through identity. In 
diaspora, one ic.lentifies not with identity, but with myth, with the active process of 
identity malcing. Jn doing so, one compears into social li fe, and one can begin the 
politics of refusing the community that is death. 
This politics of refusal is the potential that we share, a potential that emerges 
in a historical conjuncture of dispersal, such as the current era of mass migration, 
flexible accumulation, globalization, and the subsequent "postmodernization" of 
identity (l'urncr "Liberalism Citizenship"). In this way, Nancy seems to call for a 
citizenship of diaspora: one that denies the neo-liberal dream of global citizenship 
so implicated in a project of globalization from "above," yet one that recognizes 
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that the local practice of that citizenship docs not necessitate fixing that citi'l.cn-
ship to the place where it can be enacted and lived (as in the nation-state). It seems 
that citizenship in Nancy's world is relegated to the scale of communfry, as long as 
it is community without unity. 
If it appears that Nancy's politics of negativity is no politics at all, or politics 
of utopia, it is with good reason. Nancy deliberately hopes to retreat from the po-
litical as it is often understood, particularly by the Left (Sparks). This is necessary 
because politics has become the very act of fixity, and Nancy, in wanting to allow 
~~ten~ty. to flourish, must pursue a politics of mclce, or melange, in which po-
lincal tdentlty does not exist (Being Si11g11/ar P/11ra~ . Jn the end of his logk, politics 
must also be re-imagined as inoperative, as unworking itsel f, as a politics of 
"whatever" (Agamben).24 In the end, politics is not about articulating anc.J intcr-
pellating a condition of belonging (and therefore engaging the hegemonic 
struggle to make classes), but about belonging as always potential, always prob-
able, alw~ys in dis~ersal and deferral. Politics and community remains a process of 
the creation of different myths that allow for that belonging to never be inter-
rupted, or made to belong. 
Towards Community Without Unity: The Politics of Dis-
positionings 
"Th~ antimony of ~e indi.v~du~ and the universal has its origin in language 
· · · it transforms smguJant1es into members of a class, whose mcanjng is 
defined by a common property." 
- Giorgio Agambcn, The Comi11g CommH11i(J 
At ~his point it is possible to bring Bourdicu and Nancy together to formulate 
a m~arung for co~munity without unity. To do so, the argument will focus on 
mo:~g _from basmg. subjectivity in dispositions to dis-positions, to111ords dis-
pos1.tiorungs. By .rooting subjectivity at a point of dis-positioning, a point of po-
tential, .commu~ty becomes understood as the sharing of dis-positionings in a 
mo~~ direct ~olitic~ ~ha~ Nancy's eventual retreat to negativity. After outlining this 
politics of dis-postti.omngs, based in community without unity, r will attempt to 
demonsu:ate how this can be seen in action via the possible counter-work to the 
hegemonic contemporary anti-poverty efforts of post-welfare state urban com-
munity-building. 
At heart, ~is-positio?ings is a ~crmcn.cutic project that recasts Nancy's use of 
the hermenmetn, or shanng of voices with Bourdicu's call t d · h 
h · 25 . ' o cmocratlzc t c 
ermeneutic. The hermeneutics of dis-positionings ultimatel h' li 
· f · . . . . . y mgcs on a po -
tics~ nammg. More discr~tely, 1t 1s a politics of naming the doxic myth of com-
munity .through pcrformative acts. While this sort of politics serves to unbound 
the horizon of the hermeneutic through dispersal and d c l · 1 · 
. . . crerra, 1t a so remains e~framed by the limits of dtasporic reach and the relations of power shaping such 
dispersals. 
The disposition that Bourdicu initially offers is not d' · · · h 
. a 1spos1t1on m t c com-
mon sense of an inherent characteristic of a subJ'cct In h ' c 1 · f I 
. . . . . is tor mu at1on o t 1c 
real as relational, disposition emerges as the intcrscctt'on of th . · d' 'd 1 cl 
· th · · e m 1v1 ua an so-
ciety, one at ts 10 part called into being by the hjstorical st 1 tJ 
rugg cs constan y oc-
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curring to shape the field , il/11Jio and hobit11s in which it can be known as a disposi-
tion. While Bourdicu fails to adequately problcmatizc subjectivity-he merely 
identifies the point of convergence-Nancy attempts to think about djs-positions 
as moments of compearo11ce in social life, a notion that seems to more fully explore 
Bourdicu's aims. 
Nancy writes, "rOJne is not in the disposition without being with the other-
disposition, which is the very essence of dis-position" (Being Si11g11/or P/11rol 97). 
That is, because of the impossibility of liberal individuation (by which one can 
only think of singularities), subjectivity is always already implicated in social life 
through its exposure in social life. Subjectivity is always already in the process of 
becoming-with another, making itself and its other (co-ipseity). A disposition is 
never a single point that closes the individual from society but instead the very re-
lationship, the betweenness, of indivic.Juals and social life. While a disposition 
maintains distinction from the historical-geographic conjuncture that bears it, it is 
also constituting and constitutive of the others in that conjuncture. For Nancy, 
this is being singular plural. For Bourdicu, it is the limit of a shared hobit11s. l•or 
both, and for thinking through community without unity, it is the basis of the po-
tential of community. 
But how docs the dis-position bear upon itself and another? In the dis-posi-
tion, the process of identification arises as the ability for a dis-position to share 
meaning. Dis-positions, as deferred places of subjectivity, somehow interrupt the 
flow of deferred signification to forge communication. But communication, as 
myth or doxa, must not stop the flow; it need only redirect the flow into a shared 
communication. But how docs a dis-position give basis to interrupt deferred 
meaning without falling back into the trappings of community with unity? 
Through the performativc acts of dispersal that allow a common myth to prevail 
yet be infinitely reworked through a process of dis-positioning. 
To rework this, the question can be posed differently: how docs a subject (as-
suming, again, that subjectivity is fleeting) come to know itself as a subject, to 
have meaning? The short, phenomenological answer is through the Other, yet 
Nancy and those around him have shown that there is a longer answer necessary, 
particularly if the subject is to reconcile shifting subjectivity. Yet social life is a 
realm in which infinite deferrals arc an ideal state of affairs. Concrete reality (still 
very relational) is about struggles over positionings to define meaning, and these 
struggles transpire over efforts of fixing and unfixing. At times the fixing achieves 
near closure (such as the near closure of the meaning of Gcrmanncss under 
Hitler) and at times the unfixing seems more dominant (such as on the confused 
streets of Seattle a few years ago). Social life is lived through these struggles of 
position, through the politics of dis-positioning. 'lb know where this politics 
might begin, it is necessary to know how a singularity is positioned and how that 
positioning is an intcrpcllation into a class, eventually to find how that class is ar-
ticulated as unitary community. From knowing this, one can activate the work to 
dis-position, always alrcac.ly begun. One can explicitly engage in dis-positionings 
by pursuing the limits of the hermeneutic that provic.Jcs a basis for unitary com-
munity (given by the limits of the shared meaning of pcrformativc acts). This 
then becomes an cveryc.lay struggle for freedom, and the basis for community 
without unity. 
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Subjects are uttered as certain subjectivities, brought into being through dis-
course, which is the always already base of communication and foundation of a 
social formation. While not everything is discursive, the djscursivc serves as a 
foundational link to the non-discursive through the social pcrformativcs that re-
veal what is possible through discourse, through articulation. I Jowcvcr, just be-
cause one says something docs not make it happen or true, and Bourdicu is 
correct to identify that certain sayers can impose their sayings as truth more easily 
than others. Discourses are not fields without power. 'fhc sharing of myth is an 
ideal, not a descriptive statement Even so, there arc limitations on how communi-
cation is a shared myth: one must not necessarily believe it as truth, but one must 
be able to recognize it as myth, as communication, as doxa, as emergent from the 
historical-geographic horizons of meanings available to defer towards. One must 
be within the bounds of an ill11sio in order to recognize the power of the 
performativc classifications that served to fix one in a position and class, into an 
identity and a place. 
The community without unity that finds its basis in dis-positionings seems to 
be forged at the limits of the social pcrformativcs, at the very horizons of the abil-
ity to act through discourse, to communicate (in Nancy's sense of co11peara11ce). 
The community without unity is brought to bear by subjects who arc able to rec-
ognize th~ir subjectivity as a positionality brought into social Life through a 
performative act of compeara11ce within the rubric of an il/J1sio, a dispersed, defer-
ring myth. In other words, the community without unity is constructed at the limit 
b~tween deferrals of meaning and the ability to be within the il/11sio that rccog-
ruzes the ~efe~rals as su.ch,~ as still meaning something but exposed as meaning. 
Communi~ without unity ts the space opened up when meanings can be actively 
contested m terms of what they mean, precisely because they arc knowable as 
meaning. To imagine this is to imagine a cultural politics that "would seek to let 
the 'unworking' communication of community occur, or prevent its inhibition" 
(F~nsk xxvi). Dis-po~itio~jng becomes the active unworking of positionings, of 
uruty, ~nd pursues 1111ificat1011 at the moments when the space for community with-
out uruty opens. 
In this spac.c of unjficati.on of the community without unity, the struggle is at 
heart over naming, an~ p~ticularly over naming community. This struggle, how-
ever, must be the end m itself, not something that could ever be resolved. These 
~truggles are al.ways already occurring; calling for community without uni ty is call-
mg for the active engagement with such spacings. Because these aporias arc not 
everywhere and egu~y accessible, the politics of naming begins with the active 
search for the aponas (for the spaces in which to pursue community without 
unity) an~ seeks to dwell in these spaces of refusal. Community without unity oc-
curs. on sites where the s~rugglc over meaning takes place, where meaning is rcc-
ogruz~d 1101 .as false co~sc1ousness but as doxa, as il/J1sio, as myth. This politics can 
close in on itself, and if so, further spacings must be found. 
. This p~pc~ has been a? cx~loratory attempt to think through what community 
without uruty ts and how it might emerge Resting upon a n t' f d. · · . . . . . . · o ion o 1s-pos1t1on-
mg as a basts of sub1cctivity m community without uni'ty · · h . . . . . . , community wit out 
uruty maintains a point through which unification can emc 'l 'h ' 'fi · · . . . . rge. is um 1caaon is 
an explicitly polittcal project focused on the politics of na · · ming, as community 
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without unity seems to emerge at the boundary of meaning as such. While further 
work is necessary to elaborate many of the ideas within this paper, particularly in 
regards to empirical work, this paper has established some initial grounding to 
think about community without unity. At heart, community without unity is com-
munity forged in the struggle to compear and give meaning to that co1npeara11ce, 
without settljng that struggle. Communjty without unjty is struggle in itself, 
against itself. This struggle is occurring right now, in the efforts to "return to 
community" and the hegemonic struggles that vie for the meaning of commu-
nity-and for defining the boundaries of belonging-in many contemporary 
places. 
Building Community in the City 
Many of these concerns can be empirically investigated by turning to the ur-
ban arena. Jn the contemporary U.S. city, there is a current trend of rewriting the 
city from a place of pathology to a space of hope.27 This can be seen in the recent 
wave of gentrification, the promotion of the neo-traditional development model 
in urban planning, and even in the r Tope vr housing program developed by the 
U.S. Department of I rousing and Urban Development. Much of this reworking is 
occurring through the development of community, by which increasing the expe-
rience of community in the city will presumably increase quality of life.28 The turn 
to community in many cities simultaneously occurs when more and more cities 
express global ambition, and purposively attempt to achieve positions in a global 
urban infrastructure as "global citics."29 
Most poignant is the turn to community in post-welfare state anti-poverty 
work in the city. Much of this work has focused on building community to stave 
off endemic, spatially concentrated poverty, particularly to increase community 
capacity and neighborhood-level social capital.30 Programmatic efforts to build 
community unquestioningly sec community as a good because it is assumed to be 
the natural functioning of human interaction. While people should naturally relate 
through community, some sec it as necessary to impart efforts to build commu-
nity for others who supposedly lack it. 
Ultimately, this community-building work-ever present in urban civil society 
from settlement houses to Community Action organizations to Community De-
velopment Corporations-is seeing its solidification as a primary model to change 
the condition of impoverished, central city areas. The rise of such vast efforts as 
Comprehensive Community-building Initiatives (CCis) and faith-based develop-
ment programs, sanctioned by the state, puts an intensified concentration on civil 
society to solve social problems via the idea of community. 
Urban community-building is the explicit attempt to have local actors take 
control of their immediate context. It represents programmatic endeavors be-
tween impoverished neighborhood residents, philanthropies, and government 
agencies to have resident-lead strategics generated and deployed to solve prob-
lems. These problems, and the solutions to them arc conceptualized as generally 
pertaining to poverty, but arc treated as having particular nuances in different lo-
calities. The scale of these localities becomes the neighborhood, and a connection 
is made between the scale of the neighborhood and the scale of the communjty to 
be built. The parameters of community-buildjng, therefore, stretch to the limits 
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of neighborhood, assuming that this allows a level of familiarity and local knowl-
edge to coalesce into community capacity and social capital. 
What is problematic is how such a community gets closed off, particularly the 
spatial processes that lead to the area being coded as in need of community devel-
opment. Many community-building initiatives occur concomitantly with a general 
effort to revitalize an urban area. Such general revitalization efforts often attempt 
to draw upon strategies that will make a city more competitive in the midst of glo-
balization: attracting commercial development, enticing business and manufactur-
ing firms with tax incentives and subsidization, investing in and highlighting 
aspects of the city that can attract tourism and make the city more entertaining, 
and enhancing current infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, and other ser-
vices. Many of these efforts occur in strategic plans to comprehensively tic par-
ticular projects (such as the conversion of former warehouses into loft 
apartments) to other streams of development (such as the creation of artists' dis-
tricts and other commercial zones for retail outlets). But while community-build-
ing may occur simultaneously as these other efforts to rewrite urban space, 
community-building often occurs in isolation from the broader activities, so that 
local communities arc less local, and more localized, closed off from the context 
in which they reside and specifically focused on a bounded place.Ji 
Community-building programs such as CCls, which arc conceptualized more 
often in philanthropic boardrooms than in neighborhood streets, ask neighbor-
hood residents to build community amongst themselves. They assume that the 
specific neighborhood can be the borders of a community and that the simple fact 
of residency in a neighborhood is enough of a similarity in disposition that such 
similarly positioned residents would naturally form a community, if only they have 
the support to do so. Community-building offers residents the resources to make 
a strong commitment to their place of residence, their local neighborhootl, and 
the other people who also reside there. The belief that underpins this action is 
that community is the infrastructure necessary for economic development to take 
hold; by bu~din? community, residents arc engaging the process to bring invest-
ment to th~u neighborhood and allow for the alleviation of their poverty. 
But this turn towards community in the programmatic efforts such as CC is 
has failed to connect those experiencing poverty with the overarching causes of 
that poverty. By focusing r~siden~~ attention on the local, community-building ig-
nores the broader economic, political, and social forces that contribute to an im-
poverished neighborhood's ~ondi~on, forces that occur more vividly at broader 
scales than the local'. By h~vmg ~c1ghborhood residents focus on community at a 
loc~ scale, commuruty-buildcrs ignore how the urban, the regional, and even the 
nat10nal. and global scales impact a specific neighborhood's status (Pastor, Jr., ct 
al.) .. While the state~ go~J of many .c.CJs is to do just the opposite, by drawing at-
tentt?n ~o co~mu~ity with.out cxp~citly developing community without unity, this 
localizat:ton ~mds 1mpoverishc? neighborhood residents to the place of their pov-
erty. and denies th.cm the physical and social mobility that characterizes other in-
habitants of the city . 
. . Imagining community .with~ut unity as implemented in community-building, 
1t 1s necessary for commuruty builders to lay aside an assumed l · b 
. corrc aaon ctwccn 
the residents of an impoverished area (often delineated as J al l' · I · a oc po Jttca unit or a 
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census tract with over 40% of the households below the poverty line, the standard 
set by IIUD) and commonality between these residents. rurthermore, the as-
sumed difference between central city residents and suburban or regional resi-
dents must be removed as a hindrance to seeing the common fate that these 
groups share. Indeed, community-building activities should be precisely that ac-
tivities that provide the opportunity for previously "uncommon" social subjects 
to see each other as already being in common, rather than as attempts to build 
community upon assumed categories of people. 
As such, community-building would not seek to make these categories opera-
tive (such as by a localized grouping of impoverished neighborhood residents to-
gether into a cohesive unit), but by challenging the mechanisms that would 
articulate them together anc.I exclude them from being considered a part of other 
categories. One way to begin engaging this process of creating community with-
out unity, one that is more honest to how many people experience social life, is to 
use community-building as an avenue to increase the rights to the city that its us-
ers can claim.32 As cities become more and more global in the scale at which they 
operate, the rights to the city need to be c.listributcd in a similar manner, and resi-
dents of the city, especially impoverished neighborhood residents who have too 
often been characterized by and employed strategies based upon isolation, must 
be able to articulate themselves as beholden to all of the users of the city, regard-
less of residency or other markers of classification. l'he community that could be 
built could be one in which impoverished neighborhood residents can have a 
greater say in the future of the city, because they can become to be seen (by them-
selves and by others) as being in common with others beyond the parameters of 
the local neighborhood. Community-building, rather than a concerted effort to 
connect people to the places to which they "belong," could be how belonging gets 
refused. It coulc.I be the mechanism by which community is opened up, and com-
monality, beholdenncss, and collective action arc experienced as processes, instead 
of as goals to obtain. 
Conclusion 
With all of this focus on community, more critical work is needed to investi-
gate what community means and what community is to be built. ome recent 
work has demonstrated the contested meaning of community by revealing its am-
biguity.33 Further work is necessary to comprehend not only why community reso-
nates so loudly for many people (and who those people arc), but also to identify 
what community means, and how it can be reworked into a radical political con-
cept of collective identification, rather than a reactionary position in a globalizing 
world. Such work would acknowledge that community is an important concept, 
but that it needs critical evaluation to learn how it can become a powerful force in 
bringing about positive change in people's lives. 
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Notes 
1. See Birdsall; Proctor and Smith; Sack; D. M. Smith, "Geography and Ethics: A 
Moral Turn?", "Moral Progress in Human Geography: Transcending the Place 
of Good l'ortunc", and "I low l'ar Should We Care? On the Spatial cope of 
Beneficence." 
2. By speaking of community-building, I refer to the concerted efforts over the 
last several decades to have "community" enter the realm of governmentality in 
more explicit terms (in part because of the on-going devolution of state power 
and shifting meaning of the state in governing social life). Community-building, 
therefore, signifies activities from the development of gated communities in 
su~u~bs and n~ighborhood crime watches, to the public-private community 
building s trategics employed to increase the quality of life of the urban poor 
(su.ch. as C~~~unity Dc~elo~mcnt Corporations, Comprehensive Community-
building Iruttatlvcs, or mixcd-tncomc housing developments). 
3. F~r,discussion~ of biol~gically- and culturally-based exclusions sec Gilroy, There 
Am~ N o B!a~k t11 t~e. U111011 Jack: The C11lt11ral Politics of Race and Natio11 and Against 
Race: Imagmmg Pol1t1cal C11lt11re Beyond the Color Line; Butler, Gender Tro11ble: Femi-
nism a11d the Slfbver.rio11 of Ide11tity, and Rutherford. 
4. See Appadurai; Anderson; Bhabha; and, Jameson and Miyoshi. 
5. Sec Massey; Th~ift; I Iarvcy, ]11stice, Nat11re & the Geograpl!J of Difference-, Graham; 
H ardt and Ncgn; Held; Prazniak and D irl ik; Vasta; and, Jameson and Miyoshi. 
6. See Bau~an; Bellah; Putnam, "The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and 
Econorruc G rowth"; McKnight; Etzioni; and, J fall and Lindholm. 
7. See Ilillhorst; Brint; G. Smith; and, G. Rose, " lmagining Poplar in the 1920s: 
Contested Concepts of Community." 
8. See Putnam, "The Prosperous Community: SociaJ Capital and Economic 
G rowth" and Bo1vling A lo11e: The Collapse and Revival of the American Co1111111111ity-
Sampson; Turner, "Outline of a Theory of Citizenship"; N. Rose; and, J udd 
and Swanstrom. 
9. Sec fowler; King; f arncll; and, Lane. 
10. See Bourdicu and Eagleton; and, Scha ffer. 
11. Bourdieu mea~s this in tw~ ways: scholastic from the Scholastic philosophers, 
the source of his use of hab1t11s and subsequent no tions such as hcxis and doxa· 
and, the. general ~a~it11s o f ac~~c~ia in which Bourdicu is firmly situated (and: 
some mt~ht ~~y, sitting a~~p). l his double meaning lends frsclf to enact how he 
sees ones ability to be cntt.cally aware o f one's habit11s, remain within the bounds 
o f that habitlfS, and engage in stratco1cally altering the ''J b't th h · · ' 
. b" "a 1 11s roug 1mprov1sa-
tlon. 
12. Bourdicu draws this from Goffman and his notio f I · ' I B · n o cnowmg one s p acc. 
our~tc~ uses places and position interchangeably on this point, and I will fol-
low bun m that usage. 
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13. Bourdicu repeatedly uses the term "space" in what I am calling realm. I do this 
because of Bourdicu's uncritical use of the term space, which takes on a mean-
ing similar to that of Cartesian space. While the enhancement of Bourdieu's un-
derstanding of space is necessary from a geographic perspective (and can be 
done using some of the theories that speak to complex spaces in contemporary 
critical geography), this is a topic for another paper. 
14. Sec Evens; Bourdicu, "The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups", "The 
Forms of Capital", and The Logic of Practice. 
15. See Bourdicu "The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups" and ''What 
Makes a Social Class?: On the Theoretical and Practical Existence of Groups." 
16. "It is no accident that the verb kategoresthai, which gives us our 'categories' and 
'catcgorcmcs,' means to accuse publicly" (Bourdicu, "The Social Space and the 
Genesis of Groups" 729). 
17. Sec Acts of Resistance: Against the Tyralll!J of the Market, Bourdieu and Wacquant. 
18. Sec Bataillc; J ,evinas; and, Blanchot respectively. 
19. The more positive side of this statement comes from Aime Cesaire in 1955 in 
his Disco11rse 011 ColonialiS11r. "a civilization that withdraws into itself atrophies; 
that for civilization, exchange is oxygen" (11). 
20. Sec Dow; and, Nancy, The Inoperative Comm1111ity. 
21 . This is also a revision of Marx: being-with as an ontology is an attempt at a 
less onto-theological statement about ethics than Marx's species being provides. 
rurthcrmorc, Nancy writes on sharing rather than exchange; exchange is an op-
erative relation and therefore one of unfrcedom while sharing is relationally 
emancipatory. This is Nancy's attempt at a post-marxist revival of communism 
that is not totalitarian (the political realization of community without unity). 
Most famously, Nancy calls this "literary communism" (The Inoperative Co1n1n11-
11ity), in which, following Bataillc, social meaning emerges out of struggle 
through sharing, but fixing that meaning or that struggle is to create an "ac-
cursed share" (Bataillc). 
22. "Jn Nancy's terms, people like Milosevic seek to put community 'to work"' 
(Norris 275). 
23. Particularly in the Jewish diaspora. Nancy, along with others such as Blanchot, 
Derrida, Agambcn, Cixous (many of whom arc Jews), idealize the Jewish experi-
ence through diasporic dispersal and uphold the Jew as the paradigm of political 
identification. This has been taken up as well by those directly in Judaica, both 
wclcomingly and critically (sec, for example, Boyarin and Boyarin). T here is also 
a long tradition in Jewish theology to recognize the hermeneutic experience of 
Judaism and the role of narrative in establishing a point of identification with-
out definitive identity (sec Shragc) . T his connection necessitates a different pa-
per, as docs the connection between a diasporic politics of identification related 
" I .. "k I to an actor-network theory as the necessary structura constructiv1st now -
edge to formulate such diasporic politics. 
24. Sec I Tardt's endnote in The Co111ing Co11111111nity about the difficulty of translating 
the Italian q11r1/1111tp1e into Engtish as "whatever." 
69 
Lepofsky 
25. See Devisch ; and, Bourdieu, "Understanding." 
26. Bourdieu explains, "Language constitutes itself and articulates itself out o f 
the 'as'. No matter what is said, to say is to present the 'as' o f whatever is said. 
From the point of view of signification, it is to present one thing as ano ther 
thing (for example, its essence, principle, o rigin, or its end, its value, its significa-
tion), but from the point of view of mcarung and truth; it is to present the 'as' 
as s11ch" (Bei11g Si11g11lar Pl11ral 88; original italics). Also, see Agambcn. 
27. See I Iarvey, Spaces of Hope; N. Smith; D onald; and, Lees. 
28. See Evans; Sites; and, Talen. 
29. See Craig; Sassen, "The G lobal City" and Cities i11 a l'Porld Economy, Knight nncl 
Gappert; and, Yeoh. 
30. Sec Chaskin; Chaskin ct al.; Chcckoway; Clave), Pitt nncl Yin; Cohen nnc.1 
Phillips; Craig; Dickens; Dominelli; f'crguson anc.1 D ickens; Kingsley, McNeely 
and Gibson; Krctzmann and McKnight; Mattcssich, Monsey anc.1 Roy; and, 
Shaw and Martin. 
31. Sec Lepofsky and F rascr; and, Pastor Jr. ct al. 
32. See Lefebvre; Amin and Thrift; and, D onald. 
33. See Craig; Duffy and Hutchinson; G. Rose, " Imagining Poplar in the 1920s: 
Co~testcd Conc~pts of Community"; 'Talcn; and, G. Rose, "Performing lnop-
erative Community: T he Space and the Resistance of Some Community Arts 
Projects." 
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